E-Marketing under the Adverse Selection Environment: Model and Case Study by Pan, Yong
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
Eleventh Wuhan International Conference on e-
Business Wuhan International Conference on e-Business
5-26-2012
E-Marketing under the Adverse Selection
Environment: Model and Case Study
Yong Pan
Department of Logistics and E-Commerce, Henan University of Economics and Law, Zhengzhou, China,
panyong126@126.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/whiceb2011
This material is brought to you by the Wuhan International Conference on e-Business at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for
inclusion in Eleventh Wuhan International Conference on e-Business by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more
information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Pan, Yong, "E-Marketing under the Adverse Selection Environment: Model and Case Study" (2012). Eleventh Wuhan International
Conference on e-Business. 62.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/whiceb2011/62
The Eleventh Wuhan International Conference on E-Business——Innovation Management and IT applications Track 491
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Model and Case Study
Yong Pan
Department of Logistics and E-Commerce,
Henan University of Economics and Law, Zhengzhou, China
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Abstract: Information asymmetry in e-commerce market causes adverse selection phenomenon that hinders the healthy
development of e-marketing. Based on the adverse selection model put forward by American economist George Akerlof ,
who is one of Nobel Economics Prize laureates in 2001, this paper set up an e-marketing model under the adverse selection
environment in e-ecommerce market. This paper takes actual data from Taobao.com in China as samples and
demonstratively analyzes the characteristics of adverse selection problems in Chinese e-commerce market. The results
showed that reputation mechanism can effectively reduce the appearance of adverse selection, as well as electronic
intermediaries and business alliance can offset adverse selection problems. But adverse selection in e-commerce market not
only exists but also occurs more serious, which affects the function of e-marketing. Finally, this paper offers some strategic
thought and encourages sellers and buyers to trade credibly.
Keywords: adverse selection, e-commerce market, reputation mechanism
1. INTRODUCTION
Adverse selection means the selection by the consumer when faced with the circumstance of asymmetric
information. Adverse selection theory was suggested by the American economist George Akerlof (1970), who is
one of Nobel Economics Prize laureates in 2001. With this model, Akerlof indeed explains many economic
institutions and many important aspects of uncertainty. But the model studies the traditional markets (tangible
markets), how about the e-marketing market that are based on the Internet? Based on Akerlof model, this paper
builds up the adverse selection model in the e-marketing, and demonstratively analyzes the characteristics of
cyber adverse selection problem in Chinese e-commerce market and discuss the function of counteracting
mechanism such as credit evaluation system , quality-intermediary and reputation. Finally, this paper probes into
resolving approaches about the adverse selection in e-commerce.
2. ADVERSE SELECTION PROBLEM IN THE E-MARKETING
The advantage of e-commerce markets lies in its lower enter-obstacle, lower management cost and easily
acquirement for the market information. Different from the tangible markets, all the market-attendees have fair
opportunities in the network where big companies have no more predominance than little ones. In the tangible
markets the ‘big’ is a very effective market single, but in the e-commerce market the ‘ big ’ has nothing to do
with the product quality, that is, the network has the lower enter-obstacle for the marketing. On the other hand,
in the e-commerce markets we can acquire information in lower cost or no cost by the automatic search and sort
technology. So, compared with the traditional market, e-commerce market has more ways for acquiring
information, higher efficiency and lower cost – this means there are more and higher perfectibility for acquiring
information. In addition, the minimum or inexpensive payment in seeking for information result in lower
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transaction cost.
Although there are so many advantages, especially the high information efficiency, it not implies that there
should be high marketing efficiency. In fact, in the e-commerce market the adverse selection problem resulting
from asymmetry of quality information exist more seriously than in the traditional market. The reasons as
below:
• The influence of ‘information paradox’. Because the digital products mostly are experience goods, their
quality is known clearly only after being used. However, once consumers acquaint oneself with its quality they
unwillingly buy it – this is an insuperable barrier  in producing the digital commodities. This attribute makes
the manufacturers find no good methods to guarantee their products quality  to  customers. Despite a great
deal of advertisements and product’s news, the customers still not accept manufacturers’ speaking and unlikely
buy it.
• Unclear identity for online producers. In the Internet the cyber-store can be built in one day, and
disappear simultaneously too. For this type of uncertainty, the marketing efficiency in e-commerce will be
extremely low. Unclear identity for online producers makes us not know well the products quality.
• The subjectivity of evaluation about online quality. There is no doubt that the personalized service in the
Internet enables customers more frequently and more convenient. However, the personalized services make it
difficult to diffuse the reputation built in a customer to other customers, which strengthen the informational
asymmetries about product quality.
• Alternating personality of producers in network. Unlike the tangible products, the online goods are
produced and sold by the virtual persons, who exist in short time or numerously. All the users are the potential
producers or vendor by the individual homepage or web server. Hence in the e-commerce market the adverse
selection problem will be serious.
3. E-MARKETING MODEL UNDER THE ADVERSE SELECTION PROBLEM
  We can illustrate the cyber adverse selection problem in the e marketing with a simple model. We hypothesize
that there are many potential vendees and venders, who are risk neuters. The vender knows the average quality
  of his products for sale. The vendee don’t know   but he can know the distribution function f（ ） by
the guess or experience. And we hypothesize that vendee’s valuation for the product’s quality is v（ ）, whereas
vender’s valuation  is u（），obviously ∂ v / ∂  ＞0，∂ u / ∂  ＞0.If the vendee ’bid for the product is p
and bargain on this price, thus the vendee ’s utility is πB = v（）- p, and the vender’s utility isπS = p – u（）.
As it is well known to us , the bargain lie on approbatory degree for the same product’s quality, so we define a
coefficient for the quality :  = v（）/ u（）. For simpleness,  we order u（）=， thus v（）= 
（ ≥1）.
  We hypothesize that the quality distribute well-proportioned in［a ,b］,thus the density function  is f（）
= 1 /（b-a）. We use the demand cure D shows the relation between the prices that the vendee would like to pay
and the average quality of the product for sale in network, and use the supply cure S shows the relation between
the average quality and price. So, the demand cure D is:
p（ ） =  （1）
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The relation between the demand cure D and the supply cure S is as Figure 1.
In the Figure 1, the supply cure S is a line segment. From the chart we can see that the point of intersection
between the supply cure and the demand cure (i.e. equilibrium price and equilibrium quality) are increment
function of  . Therefore the marketing efficiency in the e-commerce business lies on the big or small of  .
• Under the first case, the point of intersection
（ 3 ，p3）between S and D3 correspond to  ＞1 ,the
social net benefit is:πn = πB +πS = 〔v（ ）- p〕+〔p
– u（ ）〕=（ -1） ＞0，the price and the quality for
exchange are tiptop ,the quantity of exchange is bigger,





) for the vendors.
• Under the second case, the point of intersection
（ 0 ，p0）between S and D0 correspond to  =1 , the
social net benefit is : πn = πB +πS = 〔v（ ）- p〕+
〔p – u（ ）〕=（ -1）  = 0，the price and the quality
for exchange are lowest, the quantity of exchange is
minimum.
• Under the third case, there is no the point of intersection between S and D2, i.e. there is no trade between
the vendee and the vender, here  ＜1, the social net benefit is: πn = πB +πS = （ -1） ＜ 0.
  As the   shows the approbatory difference for the same product, which virtually indicates the informational
asymmetry for the quality, so under the third case the market efficiency is the lowest – it is the condition that we
have to confront in the e-marketing.
4. POSSIBLE RESOLVING APPROACH — BASED ON THE NETWORK
In order to resolve the ‘lemon’ problem, we should tell the consumers the quality of the product — whether in
the e-commerce market or in the tangible market. However, the cyber ‘lemon ’ problem have different characters
in the two types of markets，so we should find the possible resolving approaches in the e-commerce market that
different from the tangible market. The quality-intermediary may play a very important role than other methods
in the e-commerce market. Because they profit by evaluating product quality in the network they need supplying
credible information to preserve their reputation. It is the mechanism ‘information overflow’ that impels the
middleman not selling the products from the immoral producers, and spurring manufacturers to maintain high
quality.
  We continue the anterior model to illustrate the condition that the quality-intermediary in existence. We
hypothesize to join a third party in the model, i.e. the quality middleman, which earns commission m1 and m2
from vendee and vender. And we suppose that the cost of the middleman is, thus middleman’s utility is:
πm= m1+ m2 - c (3)
The vendee’s utility is:













Figure 1. Intersection between S and D
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The vender’s utility is:
πS = p – u（ ）- m2 (5)
Thus， the social net benefit is the sum of (3), (4) and (5):
πn =πm +πB +πS = 〔v（ ）- p – m1〕+〔p – u（ ）- m2〕+〔m1+ m2 - c〕
=（ -1） - c (6)
This result shows that whole social welfare will be improved if only the expenditure c can increase   to
certain degree, i.e. πn ＞0.
Consequently, although the transaction cost in e-commerce market increase with the participation of the
middleman, the marketing efficiency enhanced simultaneously as well as. We can confirm that the quality
intermediates is an efficient approach to resolve cyber adverse selection problem in present e-market.
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: BASED ON THE DATA FROM TAOBAO
5.1 The choice of samples and data
We chose perfume trading market as study object. The reason we chose the perfume market is that it has a lot
of trading volume, multiple mass distributions and there is the possibility to reduce the uncertainty relying on
the information. Time span is three months (2010.6-2010.9).Perfume as a typical experience goods, their quality
standards are not unified, the quality identification for the level not easy to be carry out. Unless there is a wealth
of experience, it is difficult to identify their true quality and grade for the buyers after receiving merchandise.
Thus, the buyer in the purchase of such products are most likely to take a negative attitude to deal with possible
risk, that is, to choose low-price goods and refused to choose high-price goods. In other words, such
commodities trading activities contain asymmetric information that is prone to result in adverse selection
phenomenon. The data are widely distributed.
5.2 Explanatory variable
As a quality-intermediary in electronic market in China, Taobao is not responsible for identifying the quality
of products, but Taobao provides a credit evaluation system. We mainly use four major credit value indicators
from Taobao’s credit evaluation system as explanatory variables: commodity price (lnprice), the seller's
reputation rate (lnrate), whether the goods purchased is consistent with the description (wfit), The e-seller's
attitude(service), the e-seller's delivery speed( logistic), whether to join the business union (wjoin), number of
negative feedback (lnneg), whether selling perfume specially(wspec).
5.3 Data analysis
• The seller's reputation can offset the negative effects of adverse selection. All data are taken the
logarithmic form. Regression results are as follows:
ln  = 0.1407366253*ln  - 0.1337836875*lnprice rate neg
t （2.891375） （-2.448714）
+ 3.136100414*ln  - 1.221497979*ln  - 0.6665400228*ln  - 2.058656567wfit ser spd （7）
（2.002442） （-0.400940） （-0.271456） （-0.298712）
2 0.361056R = ， 0.781414DW =
From the above regression results we can see that the seller's reputation rate (rate) has a significant positive
impact for the commodity price, while negative feedback (neg) also has a significant negative impact for the
commodity price. The third indicator (wfit) also has a significant positive price effects. However, the latter two
indicators e-seller's attitude (ser) and the e-seller's delivery speed (spd) are negative, but not significant. This
may be due to multicollinearity reason. In order to eliminate the impact of multicollinearity, we merger these
indicators and then take multiple regression analysis as follows:
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ln  = 0.1537225691*ln  - 0.1319816649*ln  + 2.205280463*  - 6.888245541price rate neg wall （8）
t （3.319734） （-2.426717） （1.749006） （-1.117748）
By the integration we can see that the impact on prices has been very significant.
• Joining the business union has a positive effect on prices and can reduce the adverse selection
phenomenon. We use Probit model, modeling is as follows:
lnwabo wjoin rate  = + +
wabo is a dummy variable, which indicate that if the price is higher than the general price. wjoin is also the
dummy variable. Joining the business is 1 and 0 otherwise. We use the binary choice regression model as
follows:
1.061147 0.326624 ln 3.228768wabo wjoin rate= + − （9）
t （1.925430） （2.367242） （-2.833055）
2 0.391304R = ， DW=0.762321
The regression results shows that the variable wjoin has more significant impact on the wabo.
• Cyber adverse selection phenomenon not only exists, but also is strengthening. When we observe the
Table 2, we also found e-commerce market price significantly lower than traditional perfume market. The
results indicate that the adverse selection phenomenon still exists in Taobao's perfume market. In addition, we
can see that the variance of e-commerce market perfume prices is higher than traditional markets, which further
illustrates that the perfume on the mass distribution in e-commerce market is very uneven.This result shows
when buyers browse a favorite seller's products, they tend to believe the information about evaluation and make
their own decisions in accordance with the favorable number. These phenomena indicate that along with the
e-marketing strategy counteracting the cyber ‘lemon’ problem, there may be a force that likely to strengthen
consumers’ distrust on the network environment. It may results in ‘vicious circle’ in dealing with the cyber
adverse selection problem.
Table 1. Comparison of price and variance in two perfume markets
price
Market category
Average (median) Maximum (minimum)
variance
e-marketing market 152.4（162.6） 213（104） 2113.6
Tangible market 368（356） 470（235） 1549
6. CONCLUSION
From this analysis we can found:
• Taobao reputation evaluation systems and business alliance system with the local characteristics can
reduce the adverse selection problem in e-commerce market in china .It play a particularly important role.
Taobao as a successful e-commerce sites introduced a reputation evaluation system can eliminate negative
adverse selection effect, although it is not responsible for product quality identification.
• Cyber adverse selection problem not only exists, but has certain continuity, which cause vicious cycle in
solving the adverse selection problem and affects effect of the implementation of the reputation evaluation
system. The main reason come from malicious credit speculation in China such as brush drill, praised each other
or attacking each other, the phenomenon of revenge.
• Reputation evaluation model needs to be improved and amended to encourage buyers and sellers needs
to disclose the true quality of the transaction to obtain an honest reputation degree so that the reputation
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mechanism can effectively solve the problem of adverse selection. For example, pure virtual products should
been given smaller weights and physical goods may be given a higher weight; strengthening the weight of recent
and weakening the weight of future date; reputation evaluation should link the commodity price and so on.
7. DISCUSSION
It is no doubt that all the method in e-marketing is likely confronted with the failure in effect. When the
economic system generally occur the ‘adverse selection’ resulting from the asymmetric information, the
marketing can not get the optimal Pareto efficiency, and unluckily, we only get sub-optimal Pareto efficiency.
Grossman and Stiglitz（1980）have proved and put forward the ‘Grossman - Stiglitz paradox’. This paradox
consists of two contradictory conclusions: (1) if the information in the market is transferred adequately, the
market equilibrium is inexistent; (2) if achieving information need paying out cost, there is no the equilibrium in
the original significance. This ‘equilibrium’ paradox drastically negates the connotative presupposition that the
information is complete in traditional economics .It illustrates that complete information can not availably
enhance market efficiency, contrarily, it possibly obstructs exert of market efficiency. Hence extreme high or
low information efficiency all hinders the improvement of market efficiency. Although the information economy
don’t tell us what the information efficiency should be, it is certain that the asymmetric or incomplete
information realistic, inevitable and necessary. It is vital that we should make the best of the update technology
in the Internet to reduce the cyber adverse selection problem in e-marketing.
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